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Issues and Suggestions for the Study of Industrial Organization 
in a Regime of Rapid Technical Change 
Richard R. Nelson* 
Yale University 
My assignment is to consider the treatment of technical change in the 
industrial organization literature and to discuss how I think the fact and 
the goal of technical advance should impinge on analysis of industrial 
organization. Since several recent books have surveyed the literature, 
I will concentrate on the second part of my assignment--key issues that require 
rethinking and research.1 I shall be concerned particularly with problems 
in economic theory--the basic conceptual frames that researchers in the in­
dustrial organization field have to work with. My remarks will be focused 
on twee na~n topics. First, the firm as an innovating and adaptive organization. 
Second, the operation of market competition and other (including non-market) 
command and control mechanisms in a dynamic environment. Third, some problems 
of public poilcy in sectors and situations where technical change is important~ 
On all of these areas I will be crudely summarizing (and anticipating) ideas 
2that Sidney Winter and I are developing. 
The Firm as an Innovating and Adaptive Organization 
The theory of the firm exists at at least two analytic levels. At 
the formal level the theory postulates a set of rather simple characteristics 
*The author is indebted to M.J. Peck and R.E. Evenson for helpful comments 
although they are implicated in no way. Sidney Winter is responsible for the 
good ideas. 
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of an arch-type firm, The formal theory rests on a deeper body of thought 
which I shall call "appreciative" theory, which attempts to structure 
qualitative notions about the nature of the firm and its activities in a 
manner generally less rigorous but richer than at the formal level. While 
the theory of the firm at the simpler, more formal, level has a sharper analytic 
cutting edge, and is more capable of generating, or proving, implications, 
the premises and arguments used to specify and justify the formal models 
rest on appeal to the more basic appreciation of the firm. Further, much of 
applied research in economics is guided by the appreciative theory at least 
as much as the formal theory. This certainly characterizes much of the 
research in industrial organization. It is my contention that many researchers 
in the industrial organization fi~ld are working with an appreciative theory 
that is quite different from that underlving our textbook formal models. And 
they recognize this and somehow feel guilty about it--not theoretically kosher. 
Bluntly, I do not think that the traditional theory of the firm is 
adequate for analysis of industries in which technical change is 
important. I think that the industrial organization economist's appreciative 
theory of the firm is better than the appreciative theory of the full time 
theorist, and further provides a good basis for formal theory of an interesting 
and useful sort. The points I will make abut on the long standing debate about 
the theory of the firm--behavioralism, managerialism, and all that--but perhaps 
even more they are Schumpeterian. I will begin by questioning our traditional 
theory of the firm at the appreciative level, and then go on to ask some 
questions about what it is legitimate to assume about firms in the simple, 
formal models used in the theory of industry behavior. 
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In traditional theory the firm is viewed, first of all, as a unit; 
I will not argue about this point here;;but some of my later remarks are 
strengthened if one recognizes that there are many people, and sub-organizations 
in firms that must somehow be organized, Second, the behavior of the firm 
is viewed as subjectively rational in the non-trivial sense th~t the firm 
has some objectives in mind and some rather firmly held reasons for doing 
what it is doing--(at one extreme "calculations", at the least arguments 
based on "experience"), and objectively rational in that it would not be 
trivial for an 11 economist", who understands the decision problem, to find 
signifjcantly better policies for the firm than those being chosen, 
3 Thir.d, 
the firm is viewed as being able to operate reliably and efficiently a variety 
of "technologies", subject to the constraint of availability of the neces-
sary inputs (including the machinery, skill, etc.); however these constraints 
are assumed to be not particularly binding over the time period relevant to 
the analysis, hence the firm is viewed to a first approximation as being able 
to employ effectively any technology that any other firm can, I have asserted 
these elements of appreciative theory in a drastically terse way, while in 
fact the-appreciative theory is laden with complexity, nuances, qualifications. 
exceptions, I maintain, however, that this is a fair characterization of those 
aspects of appreciative theory to which we appeal in constructing more formal 
models. 
Once one begins to move from appreciative to formal theory this vision 
of the firm leads naturally to a model that assumes firms maximize some 
objective (the deeper theory does not necessarily imply profit) subject to the 
~ 
constraint of a production function and demand and supply equations. Since 
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subjective and objective maximization are the same, the firm can be expected 
to behave according to the optimizing rules the economic analyst computes, 
which is extremely convenient, The deeper model almost suggests that all 
firms are pretty much the same or, rather, provides no reasons why they 
should be different, and in the absence of speical reasons for postulating 
differences in technological capabilities, access to markets, or of motivation 
this generally is what we end up assuming in the formal modeling. This is 
convenient because then we can get on with the business of modeling 
industry behavior on the basis of appeal to a typical firm. And later on 
the theory generates various survival arguments that can be invoked to further 
justify this assumption. 
We end up with a theory which--at the analytical cutting edge level-­
views the firm as a competent clerk. This is so both in main line positive 
theory, and as the economist's norm. Firms carry out certain well-defined, 
widely-known activities, using generally available resources, picking the 
activities and their levels according to well-defined, easily computable 
(and optimum) decision rules. In positive theory this characteriaation 
exactly fits competitive theory under the special case where all firms 
(including the potential entrants) possess the same production sets, It 
is slightly unfair when applied to oligopoly theory where firm differences 
in production sets, supply conditions, and reaction functions are admitted 
in some models, or to monopoly where the monopolist is de facto unique. 
But the theory still gives the impression that one set of oligopolists, or 
one ,monopolist, is pretty much like any other, In normative theory also 
the characterization exactly fits the analysis of the optimality properties 
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of competitive equilibrium, with some awkwardness creeping in regarding 
oligopoly when considering research and development behavior, but the 
"interchangeable clerks" image is strong throughout. This image of the firm, 
of course, stems from our proclivity in our theory to take the technologies, 
resources, and demands as given, Thus the "economic problem11 is to get the 
job done "efficiently." Bread and automobiles are to be produced in the 
right quantities and in the right ways given the preferences, resources, and 
technologies available to the economy. (Let me ignore the question of 
distribution,) A competitive market provides clear signals as to what is to 
be done; following the signals is a straightforward business. 
This is a plausible characterization of parts of the economic problem 
and might be a good overall characterization (with appropriate market failure 
caveats) in a world of no real change; the circular flow world of Chapter I 
in Schumpeter's Jheory of Economic Development where: 
"The data which have governed the economic system in the past are 
familiar, and if they remain unchanged the system will continue 
in the same way. n3 
This is also a world in which a variety of plausible "learning" mechanisms 
pull the teeth of the "technological knowledge is not a public good" and 
"maximization is difficult if not impossible" arguments, and in which Friedman­
Alchian evolution-sur1vival arguments seem to go through (with some important 
caveats that I will not discuss here). 
The circular flow, mechanical interchangeable firms, view probably can 
keep its footing, if shakily, in a world of smooth predictable change--like 
exponentially growing factor supplies and consequent changes in demands. 
-6-
In some models technical change is treated consistently with this view-­
indeed Schumpeter himself in his Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, talks 
about the "routinization of innovation" bringing it, as·it were, back into 
his (now dynamized) circular flow models, 5 
But if technical change, and adjustment and accomodation to it, can 
ultimately be routinized, this certainly has not occured yet, 6 Innovation is 
inherently creative and personalized, In the world of Schumpeter's Chapter III, 
"While in the accustomed circular flow every individual can act 
promptly and rationally because he is sure of his ground and is supported 
by the conduct, as adjusted to this circular flow, of all other 
individuals, we in turn expect the accustomed activity from him, 
he cannot simply do this when he is confronted by a new task." 
"Carrying out a new plan and acting according to a customary one are 
things as different as making a road and walking along it. 11 7 
Economic theory simply has not grasped this distinction. Perhaps the most 
apparent and striking failure of theory is the proclivity to treat Rand D 
as "another form of investment," with, perhaps, an unusual amount of uncer~ 
tainty. But this statement, at the appreciative theory level, just does not 
characterize adequately the kinds of experimenting, error making, partial 
correcting, insightful or blind behavior that seems to go on in major Rand D. 
Nor does it appear an adequate general characterization of firms trying to do 
things they have not done before, even though other firms have. Recall 
8Kaiser's (unsuccessful) attempts to master the automobile business. Firms 
fail, and succeed, Our positive theory at the present time does not seem 
to have room for this kind of purposive, but groping behavior, that seems 
to characterize firms' operations in a regime of rapid technical change. 
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Nor does our normative theory adequately deal with this. It is clear that 
in many important sectors and situations not only is innovation important 
hut is an important part of what we want firms to do. To hit this point hard 
let me shift focus here from the (implicit) context of private goods and 
markets to the public sector, and broaden the con~ept of "firm" to include 
organizations of unspecified legal form. In the traditional public finance 
literature the task of the public bureaucracy (plus contractors) is viewed 
as analogous to the task of the firm in competitive theory--carrying out 
activities to provide "public goods" and (more usually) services. Yet a 
large share of the important programs are better viewed as trying to solve 
problems, where the solution is likely to require new hardware, or a new way 
of doing things, or a new program, hence "innovation" by the standard defini­
tion.. Project Apollo is the most striking example. Much of what we are trying 
to achieve in defense procurement also is hardware innovation. Or, consider 
the "War on Poverty" wheri e much of what we are trying to do is find (and then 
implement) programs that will work rather than "operating" existing programs 
( which are felt to be unsatisfactory) . 
I shifted to public sector activity because here it is easier to see 
that quite often what we are asking the organizations to do is "innovate", 
and not meet a well specified demand in an efficient (and well known) way. 
Yet clearly this also characterizes what we expect from (and get from) firms 
in a large number of "private good," "market organized" sectors. While we 
hear too much about "progress being our most important product," as theorists 
we have refused to absorb any of this. McNamara's statement is a bit flam­
boyant: 
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"What in the end is management's most fundamental task? It is to 
deal with change, Management is the gate through which social, 
political, economic, and technological change--indeed change in every 
dimension--is rationally and effectively spread through society, 119 
But we have to get much more of this flavor in our theory of the firm, 
The present main line appreciative theory has no real room for this, 
and industrial organization economists long have known this in their bones. In 
an environment of rapid technical change it is implausibxe to describe behavior 
in terms of concepts like "subjectively rational"--except perhaps in the 
trivial sense that the firm is trying to do as well as it can, has some 
clues as to appropriate behavior, and if it clearly saw ways to be doing better 
it would be doing them, But one would expect to find firms often having neither 
articulate reasons nor appeals to experience to justify what they are doing, 
and indeed being somewhat nervous about it, It certainly seems inappropriate 
to view behavior as being objectively rational in any non-trivial sense; in 
particular there is no case that the firm will behave according to the rules 
the "economist" calculates as optimal. And for obvious reasons it certainly 
seems a bad misspecification to assume that a firm has access--over the 
relevant analytical period--to any technology to which any other firm has 
access. For all of these reasons there is no justification for sliding 
into the notion of a "typical" firm in a dynamic environment; indeed what 
appears important is that individual firms are unique. In short, the firm 
cannot be viewed any longer as a competent, easily predictable, interchangeable, 
clerk working in a well structured environment on well defined tasks, Rather, 
the firm must be viewed as attempting to keep its footing and to make progress 
in a poorly structured and changing environment by trying and ~o.fumg new things 
as appropriate. 
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At the level of appreciative theory, how should we characterize a firm, 
ideally in a way that is consistent with the traditional perspective where that 
is appropriate? Let me appeal here to the literature on organization theory 
and the behavioral theory of the firm for justification of a presumption that, 
whether as the result of 11 rational analysis" or not, the firm at any time 
operates according to s set of decision rules that link environmental stimuli 
f . 10to responses on t he part of t he irm. In the traditional theory it is 
analytically convenient to break out some aspects of these "decision rules" 
as "technology" and separate these from others which can be characterized 
as "higher level decision rules." There are some severe difficulties with 
this clean split but I will not go into these here. In any case the theory 
of the firm aims for a convenient, and as simple as possible, characterization 
of these decision rules, If this can be deduced from, or assumed to be the 
result of, "maximization" this may be convenient but it is not necessary to 
the theory as long as the analyst can specify them somehow. Indeed a perfectly 
viable theory would simply declare the existence of these rules and certain 
aspects of their "form" and that they are stable and constant. This really 
is much of what the "maximization" theory does. All that the maximization 
connotation accomplishes is to make the specification plasusible. 
In the traditional theory these decision rules--both higher order and 
technological--are viewed as capable of invoking a wide range of firm responses 
to a considerable domain of environmental stimuli--prices, etc. This is what 
makes comparative statics work. Let me again appeal to the organizational 
literature to suggest that, rather, we should assume that the built-in 
decision rules of a firm apply to only a small domain of environmental condi­
tions and are capable of invoking only a limited range of responses. Put 
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another way the firm at any time commands only a small set of activities 
ahd has thought through responses to only a limited range of market contingencies., 
This, it seems to be, should be an explicit part of the theory. It implies 
that, unless other aspects of the theory permit one to deduce otherwise, at 
any time in an industry one might well expect considerable diversity among 
firms in terms of their operating decision rules. 
The model of the firm needs two dynamic components, One is specification 
of what determines the expansion or contr>action of the firm (rather, the level 
of employment of the decision rules it is using). That is the theory needs 
a sub-model of "widening" investment. 
In addition there needs to be an analysis of mechanisms that will induce 
firms to change their decision rules, The assumption that the firm's decision 
rules at any time are limited and simple means that in an environment of change 1 
either of external market conditions or of perceived technological possibilities 1 
the firm often will find itself in situations where its built in rules are, 
or are felt to be, inappropriate. In our analysis of the process by which 
firms change their decision rules (perhaps higher order as well as technology) 
it seems important to be much more sophisticated than we have been about 
modeling two different (although far from independent) kinds of mechanisms. 
One essentially is the processes of assessment and search that are largely 
internal to the firm. Here an obvious one is research and development, 
but I also would include here doing operations research, market analysis, 
management contemplation, etc., where the firm is scrutinizing its own 
operations and searching for ways to improve them. It seems useful to me 
to distinguish these "internal" assessment and search process from another 
-11-
are(undoubtedly linked) class of activities that look to what other firms 
In this latter class the firm is looking to sources of improvementdoing. 
by examining the behavior of other (presumably successful?) firms. While 
the internal search and the external scan mechanisms clearly should be related 
at the level of appreciative theory, at the formal theory level the first 
class can be viewed as generating innovations (not necessarily improvements) 
and the second class diffusion models. While the purpose of these activities 
is to improve performance I think it would be a grave mistake to assume that 
they do so reliably. Nor does it seem appropriate to assume that these 
mechanisms are working all the time on the full range of firm activities and 
procedures. Indeed, characterizing what things capture the attention of 
11 turn it on," and the nature of the "search"the "intelligence" mechanism and 
process would seem to require theoretical delicacy, and a lot of empirical 
11
investigation. And clearly firms differ in these characteristics. 
The explicit recognition that many of the decision rules, perhaps 
particularly technology, are subject to more than very occasional change 
of course reduces the attractiveness of a theory that appeals to stable 
that in an environment ofdecision rules. I wuold like to propose, however, 
rapid ,hange where the lower order rules may be quite unstable, one might 
hope to find more stability in the qualitative "meta" rules that gUide how 
the rules change. Thus one might well be able to identify and describe 
the intelligence mechanism of a firm, its Rand D style, the broad strategy 
that guides its search for improvements. These surely are more difficult 
on pricing (for example)to describe in a simple way than the kinds of rules 
that have been uncovered. But at the level of appreciative theory it does 
seem plabusible that firms can be characterized in these dimensions in an 
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illuminating way. Further, it seems plausible that it is at this level that 
we can find and characterize the "sensible" response to change characterizations 
of firm behavior--like if wage rates rise significantly search for ways to cut 
down use of labor--that we work so hard to deduce from our optimization models. 
One does not need an "optimization" model to predict "sensible" behavior.
12 
It is clear that at least some industrial organization economists, 
writing about important firms in industries cl:laracterized by rapid technologi­
cal change, have in fact been applying something like this kind of an appre­
ciative theory. They have been digging into and trying to characterize 
pricing policies and investment rules, without really trying to deduce these 
from optimization assumptions. Differences among firms have been a natter 
of some interest to researchers. In some of the literature there have been 
attempts to characterize the Rand D philosophy of a firm, or its overall 
13strategy. 
Thus tr.e non-traditional appreciative theory apparently meets the test 
of serving as a useful framework for empirical investigation. However one 
cannot rest comfortable with an appreciative theory in the absence of seeing 
what a formal theory, consistent with it, looks like. In the first place, 
while there inherently is a bit of fuzziness in appreciative theory, having 
and working with a formal theory serves to keep the fuzziness within bounds, 
and to sharpen up the appreciative theory. Second, as will be elaborated 
shortly, the theory of the firm is mainly used as a c~mponent of the theory 
of industry behavior, in which a more summary, formal, and manipulable model 
of firm behavior is needed. Thus it seems important to try to develop a formal 
theory of the firm consonant with the appreciative theory sketched above (which 
I suggest is not consistent with the traditional formal theory of the firm). 
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What is required is a formal theory of firm behavior that is consistent 
with traditional theory when appropriate, yet is also capable of modeling the 
innovative and adaptive firm where that is appropriate, The guidelines are 
clearly specified in the appreciative theory. The firm at any time should be 
described by the decision rules it is following and its size. These rules 
determine whatever endogenous variables the theory aims to explain as a 
function of a variety of external variables. The firm also needs characterization 
in terms of its expansion and contraction rules.and, to anticipate the theory 
of industry behavior, we need specification of what will trigger "entry" of 
a firm that is not in the industry. Several models of this sort already exist. 14 
However, for a model capable of really generating and responding to technological 
change, it seems essential to incorporate the two kinds of "learning" processes 
discussed above--some kind of an innovating or internal search for improvement 
mechanism, and some kind of an imitation mechanism whereby what one firm 
does can induce another firm to do likewise. 15 There are a variety of 
specifications that might be employed. However it seems essential that at least 
the "innovation" generating mechanism not be specified as "objectively rational. 1116 
The burden of prediction that the systems moves in an objectively rational direction 
should rest on specification of the mechanism on the diffusion machinery, and 
on responses to market pressure, It would appear that such a theory can be 
built, and is capable of generating some interesting and plausible implications. 
The merit of such a formal theory, as suggested akove, is mainly to be found 
at the level of our theory of the industry, to which I now turn. 
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Dynamic Market Competition and Other Forms of Innovation 
Generating and Selecting Environments 
Economists, particularly industrial organization economists, seldom 
are interested in the behavior of particular firms, but rather in the behavior 
of industries or sectors. The sector is usually (but not always) o~mprised 
of a number of firms whose behavior cannot be assumed to be independent. 
Further, the dimensions of sector behavior in which we are most inter.ested 
usually involve, in an essential if often summary way, specification of 
what is going on outside the particular group of firms comprising the sector. 
We have a traditoin of viewing firms as means, not ends. Thus in our theory 
of industry behavior we are concerned with the way in which "demands" for 
·the output of the sector get generated, and the extent to which the sector satisfies 
these demands. We also have an appreciation of general equilibrium consider• 
ations even in our partial equilibrium analysis, thus we are concerned with 
the "costs" of operating the sector at various levels and ways, and the extent 
to which the sector operates to minimise real costs at any level of operati,on_, 
and balances marginal benefits and costs. 
T,hus in conceptualizing at the industry level we generally employ a 
greatly stripped down and simplified theory of the firm. In addition to 
specification of the characteristics of firms, our theory of the industry 
or sector, both at the appreciative and the formal modeling level, involves 
specification of the environment within which firms operate. The "market" 
in traditional theory is a model of such an environment which determines 
the signals, incentives, and constraints which impinge on firms and thus on 
their behavior. In the traditional theory the environment is determined 
·~ 15 .., 
by two classes of factors. One is the behavior of the "outsiders" particularly 
those who demand the good or service the firms in the sector can provide, 
and those who supply inputs which have alternative uses or values. The 
other is behavior of the internal system taken as a group--the competition 
that goes on among the indi'lfidual .;ffirms. Thus the m~rket is at once a connec­
ting link between demanders and suppliers of both products and inputs, and 
a constraining structure of the behavior of the inBiiers: in short, an 
apparatus of command (through effective demand) and control (through competition), 
There are many other kinds of command and control structures, such as those 
that characterize primary education and medicine, or the foreign policy 
establishment. I take it that the command and control structure is the referent 
of "organization" in the subject of industrial organization and that although 
we tend to concentrate on "markets" (just as we have tended to concentrate 
on firms which aim for a profit) the subject matter of industrial organization 
in principle includes non·--market command and control structures (and organi­
zations with objectives defined in terms other than profit). 
I make these more or less obvious remarks so that we can be clear that 
the traditional theory of industry behavior in a market environment is a 
special case. In the traditional theory the signals and incentive generation 
mechanism is modelled as well-perceived product demand and factor supply 
curves. The internal control environment is deduced from the condition 
that no firm (not just any particular firm) can imporve its profit conditions~ 
Clearly our modelling of sectors which are not controlled by the markets 
would be somewhat different. However our analysis of market sectors, and 
non-market sectors, has been dominated by notions of steady state equilibrium 
associated with our notions of firms as clerks working in a well defined 
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and relatively constant environment.
17 
The discussion in the preceding section suggests that this positive 
theory does not adequately characterize the environment of firms where 
technical change is rapid. The assumption of a well-perceived demand curve 
for product or supply curve for input is plausible enly if one can describe 
mechanisms whereby those curves in fact get well perceived. This would 
seem to imply considerable experience on the part of the firms in the industry 
in the relevant regime of demand and supply conditions. This clearly cannot 
be assumed in an environment of rapid change either in demand or in supply 
conditions. In particular it seems completely implausible in considering the 
demand for a major innovation. Nor under these conditions does it seem plausi­
ble to model the environmental constraints in terms of industry equilibrium 
for that is not where the action is going on. If the industry or proalem 
we are concerned with looks like one in which we can expect change in the 
"equilibrium conditions" which is rapid relative to the speed with·which 
equilibrium is approached, or even in which one doubts that equilibrium 
(perhaps constant) will be closely approached during the relevant time interval, 
one should not play equilibrium games. Rather one has to work with an ex­
plicitly dynamic model of firm and industry behavior. The competitive 
environment of any firm is provided by the others moving toward equilibrium. 
but not by their presence there. 
The problem is not just in positive theory as a framework for description 
and explanation; it is in normative theory as a framework for evaluating 
a weperformance. If doing things better is good part of what are trying 
to call forth, the market cannot be conceived of strictly as a mechanism to 
"control clerks" (which is the image of Langian socialists as well as of 
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nee-classical economists who believe that actually having competition may 
be easier than getting the decision rules of competition followed without 
really having real competition). Rather the market has to be viewed as a 
mechanism stimulating new mutation (innovations) and doing a creditable 
job of somehow discriminating among the good and the bad, spreading the former 
and killing the latter~ Even in an environment where rapid technological 
change is occurring and is highly ~iued, this is far from all that we want 
from all that we want from a market control system. In addition we want 
that system to stimulate and enforce the nee-classical virtures of economic 
efficiency, both in the appropriate level~~ output and in the minimum economic 
cost sense. But since these are going to be changing over time, here too market 
. d . t fcont rol must be viewe in erms o s t·imu1at"ing moves in. the rig. ht d"1rect1on.· lS 
Again let me focus on public sector activity to hammer home the point-• 
as well as to introduce a policy issue that I will treat in the following section­
The 1960's marked the burgeoning of interest in systems analysis (or cost-
benefit analysis or any of a number of titles) as a tool for governmental 
decision making. Thinking of the decision maker (the systems analyst? the Cabinet 
Secretary? the President?) as commanding a bureaucracy under him led to a sharp 
split between the public finance literature where demands (decisions) automatically 
were fulfilled and the industrial organization literature where demands had to 
draw forth responses by impinging on a (market) environment of potential suppliers. 
As experience has accumulated the clean lines that once used to exist between 
industrial organization and public finance have been destroyed. There has been 
growing appreciation that getting the program performed (the demand met) required 
the appropriate responses on the part of a variety of organizations, public and 
-18·· 
private.. A d . b . . 1 h h. · 19n it ecame no trivia. l 'increasing y apparent tat tis was requirement~ 
Getting the education or health industries to do what the federal government 
wants it to be doing turns out to be extremely hard. Here part of the difficulty 
resides in that the federal government is only one of many who are trying to get 
the system to do what they want. But President after President has found it 
difficult if not impossible to get the State Department to do what he wanted. 20 
The point I am trying to make is that having a well wo~king command and control 
structure over a group of "firms" is no trivial matter and that non-market 
sectors have the same command and control problems as the market sector. 
However, note that to a considerable degree where the non-market sectors 
seem to be falling down is an effective adaptation to change--technological 
and other, The education sector has been failing to develop appropriate responses 
to the rise in teacher salarie.s which we would have hoped would have generated 
some effective search for ways to increase the pupil-teacher ratio through increased 
capital intensity or mere efficient techniques of teaching. And it has failed 
abysmally to respond to the changing nature of the demands put upon it, largely 
learning how to educate children from non-middle class families with non-middle 
class values, but also how to e:lucate bored middle class kids and how to operate 
integrated schools. Similarly the health sector has not learned to respond to 
r-ising physicians'· s7J.:--.r.:'..u and fees, and the changing nature of demands put on it. 
These~ and I su.cgcst most impo1~tant kinds of responses to changing factor 
prices and demands tha.t we i,rant of an economic sector, and get out of some, 
do not seem characterizabJ.~ by the nee-classical allegory, As stressed in 
Section I, that allego:t:'y implies much mo1'e complex decision rules keyed to a 
richer domain of possible external situations and range of responses than we have 
any reason to assume. For impor~ant (large) changes, say in relative factor costs 
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or in demands, I do not think that we can assume firms have an "already thought 
through" response or that they can think through to a response ex-ante that is 
subjectively and objectively rational. Rather the response has to be considered 
as an innovation which may or may not turn out to be really economic or really 
responsive. 
Some evidence on this, and some implications for the theory of "markets" 
and other forms of command and control structures, is provided by what has 
happened to the perception of "systems analysis" over the past few years 
particularly in domestic programs. I think it fair to say that in the mid-
1960's there was a faith that with good analysis we could reliably choose 
among alternative programs on the basis of data gathered and analysis done 
ex-ante even though these programs were in large part untried and the demands 
had never before been adequately met. We felt we could do this without 
actually really observing the alternatives in action, In effect the faith here 
was closely analogous to the economic theorist's allegory about the wide range 
of choices and circumstances over which the firm can make rational choices 
ex-ante. As experience accumulated it became clearer and clearer that there 
seldom was sufficient information ex-ante to make reliable bets, and that at 
the least ex-ante analysis had to be complemented by ex-post evaluations. More 
recently of course thinking about rational policy development has moved more 
and more toward conscious experimentalism, with the role of the analyst seen as 
that of setting up a number of experi~ntal programs to obtain data and to 
try them out, and then on the basis of later data generated in the course of 
. d . f . h f 1 ·t he program, select ing or mo 1 ying t e menu o a ternatives. 
21 In short 
the model of how public programs should be chosen has moved fro.m the rational choice 
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ex-ante paradigm to a paradigm which explicitly recognizes that the problem is 
that of trying out new things, and getting appropriate feedback for screening 
and selection. 
There is no reason to believe the situation is much different in market 
sectors. While public sector industries seem to have unusual difficulties 
particularly in selecting and spreading good innovations, in the private sector 
as well as the public dynamic processes seem necessa•.'Y to characterize in terms 
of a flow of innovations, many of which are no improvement at all, mechanisms of 
selection, and diffusion, Traditional theory that relies heavily on equilibrium 
conc~pts seems to abstract away from these phenomena and their implications. A good 
dynamic industry model, I suggest, incorporates a stripped dovm version of the 
theory of the firm proposed in the preceding sections. Many people have granted 
that a quasi behavioral model has appeal as a model of a particular firm but have 
doubted whether it can be incorporated into an industry ~.actor. The claim here is 
that it can, indeed it is the natural model of the firm to use in a model which 
includes the possibility of dynamic competition. Firms are characterized by their 
technologies and static decision ru•es, and also by the way they generate innovations, 
ex.p.and o:i:?'., contract as a function of their profitability, (imitate successful) innovat­
ions of others. What are the required components of a theory of command and control 
structure (competition) in an environment where rapid technological change is 
desired or occurring? The objective is to model "demands" and "competitive 
pressures" in a way that fits our proposed general model, that is consonant with 
traditiori~i. theory where that is appropriate, but which also characterizes more 
adequately a dynamic changing environment where that is appropriate. 
First, there has to be much more sophistication in modeling the "demand for 
innovation." There are significant probl?ems in positive modeling, It cannot simply 
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be assumed that there is a well perceived demand curve. One has to get a 
realistic specification of the speed with which consumers assess the pluses and 
minuses of the new innovation and in turn how this affects the signals and 
profitability of the innovating firm. There also are some major normative issues. 
In a dynamic environment it is doubtful that consumers immediately assess 
accurately the properties of the new products--there are real issues to be considered 
regarding the effectiveness of consumer evaluation procedures. While economists 
increasingly are looking at problems of externalities,; these would appear to 
warrant even more consideration in an environment where rapid change is occurring. 
There may be something to the argument that with enough time forces of self interest 
will cope with the externalities problem. However, the mechanisms that get 
externalities reflected in bargains and in incentives to producers cannot be 
assumed to work quickly, One would expect externalities to be rampant in an 
environment of rapid technical change. 
Second, the dynamics of interactive behavior of the group of firms in the 
sector needs to be modeled quite carefully. The analysis needs to trace through 
the manner in which the responses of consumers to an innovation, and of the 
innovating firm to the success of its innovation, change the environment for 
22other firms and in turn affect their behavior, which feeds back, etc. The 
nature of the expansion and contraction, and entry and exit behavior of the firms 
clearly is an important characteristic of the dynamic sector environemnt. 
In addition to asking the extent to which improved performance gets reflected 
in higher profit, one must ask how sensitive are expansion and contraction 
rates to profitability (using the term as a general proxy for whatever the 
organization aims for)? How sensitive are entry rates to the average pro­
fitability of firms in being? Are these limits on firm size (or more saliently 
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on the extent to which particular firms can and will use a particular tech­
nology or innovation)? To the ~Rt~nt eKpan~ion rate§ are not particularly 
sensitive to "profit", or there are sharp limits on ulitmate size 9 the 
efficiency of dynamic response is deterred directly, and also indirectly 
because (under plausible models) less pressure is put on the non-innovatol:"s, 
One is tempted to conjecture that sectors in which individual organizations 
are bounded geographically (schools?) provide a less dynamically stimulating 
environment than those in which growth of any particular organization is not 
closely bounded. But in any case it would seem that analysis of this kind 
of question is important in studies of any particular sector, 
Successful innovations spread in part through growth of the innovators, 
in part through imitation. It is apparent that in market sectors both 
mechanisms are at work, although the relative importance of each does not 
appear to have been studied much and probably varies from sector to sector. 
It is important to note that the two mechanisms are not independent. In 
public or non-profit sedtors the "expansion of the innovator" mechanism is 
largely or totally scotched. This means that a desirable innovation cannot 
be spread without imitation. At the same time it means that little or no spur 
is put to organizations to adopt; there is no; build up of competitive 
pressure on the "public monopoly." 
There are some compensating considerations. In particular while the 
incentive to imitate is weakened when the innovating unit cannot or will not 
e)4:and 9 at the same time there is no incentive for the innovators to try to 
deter imitation (which for example is the role of the patent system in the 
private sector). Organizations that cannot expand, and who know others 
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cannot, have little to gain by preventing others from adopting their 
successful practices. Much of the (still remaining) faith in the ability to 
diffuse successful innovations through publicly structured sectors, despite 
the lack of any clear cut profit-like incentive and despite the existence 
of sharp boundaries on organizational size, rests in a faith in the apparatus 
for generating imitation. 
,,
However, we know precious little abo~t "diffusion" 
mechanisms and patterns of a sector should be a prime topic for investigation,, 
in studies of industrial organization in an environment of change.
/ 
If §ff® can assume that the speed of consumer response and strength of 
feed-back to suppliers for better or lower price products is great enough, 
expan:;ion and contraction rules are sensitive enough to "profit", and that 
imitation mechanisms work quickly and reliably relative to the pace at which 
innovations occur, then it seems reasonable to model the environment in terms 
of equilibrium conditions. But in a world of rapid innovation, one must pay 
explicit attention to the transients. 24 It does seem possible to develop a 
general model that is capable of generating competition in the nee-classical 
sense, and competition as Schumpeter described it, depending on what one 
assumes about key parameter values, And which it is in any partiuclar 
sector clearly makes a difference, both in terms of positive description 
and analysis, and in terms of the major public policy issues to watch out for. 
Policy Issues 
In this concluding section I will discuss, in summary form, two major 
policy issues involving industrial organization in a regime of actual, or 
desired, rapid technological change. These are worthwhile discussing for 
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their own sake, but also for the opportunity they afford to develop further in 
a concrete setting some of the points made abstractly in the preceding two 
sections. The first involves issues in trying to program very rapid technological 
advance in particular sectors. The second involves problems of generating, 
selecting, and diffusing innovation in public sector or mixed industries. 
Programming of rapid_technological advance. As remarked earlier, in 
Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, Schumpeter presented the vision of 
a future world in which major innovation was routinized, In his New Industrial 
State Galbraith suggests that this stage essentially now has been reached 
in the large American corporations, and Servan Schriever takes a similar 
position regarding practice in the United States, The standard economist's 
model incorporating R and D likewise is consonant with this perception, treating 
Rand Das basically an investment decision not unlike most others. 
The theoretical restructuring proposed in the preceding section conflicts 
strongly with this point of view. In several places I insisted that the 
innovation process not be modeled as objectively rational either in the 
sense that outcomes can be closely predicted in advance or in the sense that 
outside experts (the economists?) would agree on the predictions. Relatedly 
I insisted that a good fraction of innovations are not improvements. In 
the "industry" modeling of technical change I rested considerable weight 
on the gener>ation of a ,·-ariety of innovations and hence on processes of 
ex-post evaluation and selection. 
This disagreement about the nature of the innovation process is important 
not only for modeling but also for policy. If one believes the routinization 
of innovation--R and D a.s investment---theory ~ then one soon is drawn toward 
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looking to Rand D, focused on particular national problems, as not just a 
promising but a reliable instrument for public policy. Further, belief in 
the reliability of the instrument naturally leads one to analyze in advance 
the range of alternatives~ pick the one that looks best, and put your chips 
on it, If, on the other hand, one believes that Rand Dis extremely uncertain 
one adopts a "let a thousand flowers bloom" point of view, sees Rand Das 
an interesting perhaps highly promising policy instrument, but does not treat 
the instrument as reliable, hence hedges both by using other instruments and 
by spreading the Rand D bets. The first approach leads to the Defense style 
of Rand D, and to such forced paced programs as the Super Sonic Transport 
and the breeder reactor program of the Atomic Energy Commission. The second 
perception leads your in public sector areas, to spreading of funds such as 
done by the National Institutes of Health, and in private sector areas of 
seeking to encourage a diversity of research and development, private as well 
25
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. as pu 1.c. 
History seems much more consonant with the mutation-selection model. 
One of the most striking impressions of the history of technological advance 
in most American industries is the diversity of sources, New products, processes, 
inputs, equipment for an industry have come from many different firms in the 
industry, suppliers, purchasers, new entrants to the industry, outside 
individual inventors. Many developments that early seemed very promising did 
not pan out. Many important breakthroughs were relatively unexpected and were 
not supported by the experts in the field. While detailed histories are not 
plentiful and many of these do not shed light on the question, one has the 
impression that in most of the technically progressive industries, like chemicals, 
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and electronics, most of the bad bets were rather quickly abandoned, 
particularly if someone else was coming up with a better solution, and good 
ideas generally had a variety of paths to get their case heard. 
The post mid-1950 1s military research and development programs, the civil 
reactor program of the Atomic Energy Commission, and experience to date with 
the Super Sonic Transport, is a sad contrast. In these areas the early batting 
average has been dismal, just as it has been in the domain of decentralized 
development. But there aas been a proclivity to stick with game plan, 
despite mounting evidence that it is not a good one, that appears only in 
exceptional cases in areas wher.e Rand D was more decentralized and competitive. 
The case of Convair throwing good money after bad on the 880 development 
rightly is regarded as an aberration, and the fact that General Dynamics 
had learned its style in military Rand D undoubtedly was a contributing 
factor. But this kind of thing is the rule, not the exception, in military 
Rand D. The B-58 and TFX Were pushed a11 the waY through development despite 
mounting unfavorable evidence. The B-70 and Skybolt were halted short of 
procurement but long after the signals were clear that they were bad ideas. 
It is a good bet that Boeing would not have persisted so long in pushing its 
swing wing SST design had the bulk of the funds been its own and had it the 
expectations of a market test against alternatives. I think the signals are 
clear> enough that the present design is in trouble. It is the monopoly 
position and lack of pressure from an alternative that carries the project 
forward in its present conception. Similarly, throughout the history of 
the AEC's power reactor program, there have been complaints that the AEC was 
persisting in Rand Don designs long after evidence had accumulated that this 
was not an attractive route, and conversely, that the AEC has been very sticky 
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about initiating work on new concepts. 
The problem transcends the likely inefficiency and high cost of 
innovation in industries where the mutation-selection model is not applied. 
These sectors are likely to end up with a far too limited range of choice, and 
further with. the government as a powerful ,1c,;:,byist for the particular 
technologies. It is rather surprising that the producers of coal and oil, 
and of power generating equipment using conventional fuels, have not raised 
more noise than they h~ve regarding the pressure being applied to the 
utilities by the AEC to install nuclear rather than conventional power. 
While the evidence on the nature of thermal pollution and nuclear waste 
problems now is far f1~om c!f,,0.r, and nuclear power still probably looks 
good compared to conventional power regarding pollution and waste problems, 
I think we should feel some discomfort that a strong government lobby has a 
stake in the issue. There has been more vocal concern about the implications 
of a governmental financial stake in the SST, perhaps because of the explicit 
"revenue sharing" provisions in the program. But even without a financial 
stake, the higher executives and congressmen who support the programss/·/ 
/have a personal credibility stake in the success of the products_,.and processes 
they push so hard. It is relatively clear tr.dt:: the success 9f 
/ 
the SST program, 
measured in almost any dimension that has been tal1':?{i a90ut, will depend highly 
on the fare structure as a].lowed and encouraged by tne CAB. The CAB can go a 
long way towards mald.n_;.:; the SST program a fi11ancial success, by fighting for 
and uniform fares ( s::i tha·~ the lower> cost technology will not be able to compete 
in the dimension whc~c' it is st-.r>ongest). 1'hese are the kinds of consequences 
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one runs into, I suggest, when one tries to predict and plan innovation 
closely, rather than viewing the innovation process as one of mutation and 
selection. 
'l'it.e problem of achieving dynamic efficiency in the pub..ic sector. Earlier 
I made the point that the prob:em of efficiency in public sector activities 
is, in good part, a problem of industrial organization. We economists have 
neglected this perspective before because of our lack of attention to the way 
that public goods or services get provided. Implicitly we have assumed that 
once the public decision was Ir.a.de (we spent a lot of attention on how that should 
be done) it was as good as effected. It now is clear that the public decision 
(even assuming there is such a clean cut thi-r.g) has to be treated like a 
"demand" in the theory of industry bahavior, for tltte appropriate actions usually 
must be drawn forth from institutions--often some private as well as public--
who cannot be assumed to jump simply because the President or the Secretary 
says to jump, And very often the institutional structure provides the President 
or the public with no ~r limited alternative sources; there is no real competitive 
mechanism, 
The combination of the demand characteristics of public sector activities, 
and the organizational structl.lr'e of the sector, apparently yield serious 
problems in a dynamic environment. I think most of us would agree that the 
dynamic pel'fJrmance of too large a fraction of the public and non-public sector 
has been extremely poor. While I have not collected any numbers and don't ev~~. . 
know what numbers I should collect, my impression is that the average public 
sector batting average is much wprse than the performance, on average. of sectors 
\ ~". . 
where the command and control mechanism is based on a real market for final 
products which links consumer satisfaction rather tightly to the profit or other 
success measures of the firms. 
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The problem is not characterizable as too little research and development. 
In some sectors--like education or urban services--this may be the case. 
But in both defense and health there has been a lot of Rand D, and technical 
change has been extremely rapid. But it also has been extremely expensive 
and poorly screened. My remarks above on the p~oclivity for expensive failures 
in defense research and development apply. In health one has the strong 
impression that one of the reasons for rising health costs has been the 
procliv.ity of doctors and hospitals to adopt almost any plausible new thing-­
drugs, surgical methods, equipment--that increases capability in any fimension 
(and some for which that isn't even clear) without regard to cost. 
The basic problem appears to reside in the screening and spreading mechanism 
and seems inherent in a sector where for a variety of reasons full blown 
consumer sovereignty is not possible or desirable and it is difficult to specify 
a set of clear cut performance measures on which people can agree. Most of the 
traditional discussion, however, has been concerned with the characteristics 
of equilibrium positions. I would like to argue that if the world is like 
Schumpeter's circular flow, one can conceive of a variety of mechanisms that 
ultimately can move the decision rules of a public or not-for-profit firm towwd 
those which reflect the public interest. The adjustment process~ clearly would 
be slow but it would get you there. Thus I am arguing that the serious problems 
of thsee feedback systems arise in a dynamic environment where change is 
occurring or is demanded. 
How do we go about improving the performance of our educational system? 
The answer is not clear. Clearly we want to get more new approaches and 
programs tried out and evaluated. It seems plausible that the design and funding 
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of major experiments should be undertaken at the federal level. But how 
does one really "evaluate"? Should success or failure be judged on 
the basis of how well children or their parents like the program? We long 
have been leary of putting too much weight on this for a variety of read reasons. 
What objective scores are relevant? Clearly this is arguable. I maintain 
that with enough time and experimentation with a fixed number of alternatives 
(and easy modifications) it would be possible to get wide spread agreement. 
But this takes time. And by the time we know how to evaluate the last 
block of alternatives we are faced with a new block of alternatives and 
conditions. 
The point is salient in considering the new federal ventures toward 
educational reform. The nation~learly is beginning to put together the 
apparatus for running a lot of experiments, which does seem to me in advance 
regarding how to generate an interesting spectrum of innovations. Two other 
new proposed departures recognize the command and control over autonomous 
units problem, and cut at it from antithetical points of view. The educational 
voucher idea tries to build up the power of consumer sovereignty, and suffers 
from the variety of worries we have about this alluded to above. The 
pe~formance contracting route attempts to increase the mc,tiviting power of 
those who think they can set objective standards, and indirectly to increase 
incentives to imitate the experimental programs that score well by these 
standards. But the difficulties discussed above remain. As an in-between version 
one might well think of a voucher system, complemented by widely publicized 
evaluation of schools' performances according to the proposed relevant measures, 
to educate and inform parents~ All of these are important structural changes. 
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They clearly will help to make the system more responsive and progressive 
if we can solve the problem of evaluation, of distinguishing good departures 
from poor ones. But the "if" is basic and the solution to this is not going 
to be easy. 
These remarks were focused on education to be specific, but I suggest 
they are applicable to a wide range of public and non-profit sectors. 
make them not because I have a solution, but rather in the hope that the 
appreciative theory of the problem may be useful, and because I think it 
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